My book project examines how economic elites' historical reliance on distinct forms of labor control under authoritarianism shaped subsequent struggles over regime type. While some elites pursued labor repression—a commonly studied independent variable—also prevalent were less coercive forms of control that similarly constrained workers' ability to act in ways that ran counter to elite interests. These often-overlooked forms of labor control, which I label “co-optive,” involved the provision of select labor concessions structured to facilitate employer monitoring of and influence over worker activities. In cases ranging from Argentina and Peru to the United States and France, factory owners and landowners formed "company" unions that prevented affiliated workers from participating in activities that threatened elite interests. In other cases of co-optive control, landowners in Great Britain and Chile developed paternalistic systems of land tenancy that deterred tenant farmers from challenging them.

My book examines how these distinct strategies of labor control—co-optive or repressive—shaped the prospects for democracy in the near and long term. I argue that economic elites' pursuit of either labor co-optation or repression led to the emergence of elite divisions over democracy. These divisions pivotally shaped the likelihood of democratic transitions and—where such transitions occurred—subsequent democratic breakdown.

The first part of my book examines episodes of democratization, demonstrating that the pursuit of co-optive control made elites more likely to support transitions to democracy. Labor co-optation, which did not rely on overt violence, could be transferred to democratic contexts. In contrast, repression was challenging to employ under democracy, a regime in which states are less likely to tolerate violence against workers. The capacity to continue exercising co-optation in democratic settings gave elites who pursued this form of control a critical competitive advantage over those who relied on repression, as this latter group of elites was likely to face challenges in maintaining their primary strategy of labor control in the democratic period. Co-optive control could also provide crucial electoral benefits, as it could be employed to mobilize workers to support political parties that furthered elite interests under democracy.

I then demonstrate that elites who pursued labor repression shaped the likelihood of subsequent reversions to authoritarianism. The pursuit of repression under authoritarianism bred animosity between elites and workers that limited elites' ability to pursue co-optation following democratic transitions. Coupled with the challenges of employing repression under democracy, it became difficult for elites who previously relied on repression to maintain control over their workforce. These elites also faced a political disadvantage because, unlike those who pursued co-optation, they struggled to mobilize their workers electorally. They thus had incentives to undermine new democracies and promote reversions to authoritarianism.

To substantiate my argument, I combine in-depth studies of Argentina and Chile with evidence from cases across Latin America. A central empirical challenge of the project involves systematically assessing economic elites' role in struggles over regime type without relying on measures that conflate the preferences and behaviors of economic elites with those of politicians—such as roll call votes. To overcome this challenge, I compile original datasets on local elite committees formed to support pro-democracy politicians, along with individual-level data on economic elites' participation in conventions to select pro-democracy presidential candidates. I likewise construct novel measures of elites' reliance on co-optive labor control. These measures include the prevalence of paternalistic systems of land tenancy and elites' participation in organizations that promote these and other co-optive labor arrangements. Finally, I measure economic elites' efforts to undermine democracy using data on membership in anti-democratic social and political organizations. The book also draws on data from historical newspaper accounts, legislative debates, administrative records, personal correspondence among economic elites, and individual-level census data. 

The book's argument and evidence contribute to scholarship examining the role of elite splits in struggles over regime type. Scholars have increasingly noted how divisions among authoritarian elites can foster democratization. I document a previously unexplored source of these splits—economic elites' reliance on either repressive or co-optive labor control—and demonstrate their enduring impact on the stability of new democracies. As I show, while elite divisions can promote democratization, they may also contribute to future instances of democratic breakdown.

In documenting these divisions and their pivotal impact on regime outcomes, my book likewise contributes to an extensive literature on the role of labor-dependent elites in struggles over regime type. While existing studies focus overwhelmingly on elites' dependence on labor repression, the argument and evidence I present highlight the importance of other forms of labor control. My work demonstrates that co-optive control, while often overlooked in existing scholarship, can promote the emergence and stability of new democracies.