My book project examines how economic elites’ historical reliance on distinct forms of labor control shaped subsequent struggles over democracy. While some elites pursued labor repression—a commonly studied independent variable—also prevalent were less coercive forms of control that similarly constrained workers’ ability to act in ways that ran counter to elite interests. These often-overlooked forms of labor control, which I label “co-optive,” involved the provision of select labor concessions structured to facilitate employer monitoring of and influence over worker activities. In cases ranging from Argentina and Peru to the United States and France, factory owners and landowners formed “company” unions that prevented affiliated workers from participating in activities that threatened elite interests. In other cases of co-optive control, landowners in Great Britain and Chile developed paternalistic systems of land tenancy that deterred tenant farmers from challenging them.

My book examines how these distinct strategies of labor control—co-optive or repressive—shaped the prospects for democracy in the near and long term. I argue that economic elites’ pursuit of either repressive or co-optive control affected their attitudes toward democracy. Because these actors have exercised outsized influence in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, their preferences have pivotally shaped the likelihood of both a democratic transition and—where democracy happens—subsequent democratic breakdown.

The first part of my book examines episodes of democratization, demonstrating that the pursuit of co-optive control made elites more likely to support democratic transitions. Co-optive control, which did not rely on overt violence, could be transferred to democratic contexts. In contrast, repressive control was difficult to employ under democracy, a setting in which states are unlikely to tolerate violence against workers. The capacity to continue exercising co-optation under democracy gave elites who pursued this form of control a key competitive advantage over those who relied on repression, as this latter group of elites was likely to face challenges in maintaining their primary strategy of labor control in the democratic period. Co-optive control could also provide important electoral benefits, as it could be employed to mobilize workers to support political parties that furthered elite interests in democratic periods.

Crucially, the pursuit of repression under authoritarianism bred animosity between elites and workers, which limited elites’ ability to subsequently pursue co-optation following democratic transitions. It thus became difficult for elites who previously relied on repression to control their workforce, making democracy more threatening to their economic interests. They may have also been at a political disadvantage because, unlike elites who pursue co-optation, it is difficult for them to mobilize their workers electorally. These elites thus had incentives to undermine new democracies and promote reversions to authoritarianism.

To substantiate my argument, I combine in-depth studies of Argentina and Chile with evidence from cases across Latin America. A key empirical challenge of this project involves systematically assessing economic elites’ role in struggles over regime type without relying on measures, such as roll call votes, that conflate the preferences and behaviors of economic elites with those of politicians. To overcome this challenge, I compile original datasets of local elite committees formed in favor of pro-democracy politicians and individual-level data on elites’ participation in conventions to select pro-democracy presidential candidates. I likewise construct novel measures of elites’ reliance on co-optive control, a concept I develop extensively in the book, using data on the prevalence of co-optive systems of land tenancy and elites’ participation in organizations promoting these and other co-optive labor arrangements. Finally, I measure economic elites’ efforts to undermine democracy using data on their membership in anti-democratic social and political organizations. This data is supplemented with evidence from historical newspaper accounts, legislative debates, administrative records, personal correspondence among economic elites, and individual-level census data.

The book's argument and evidence contribute to scholarship examining the role of elite splits in struggles over regime type. Scholars have increasingly noted how divisions among authoritarian elites can promote democratization. I document a previously unexplored source of these splits—economic elites’ pursuit of distinct forms of labor control—and demonstrate their enduring impact on the stability of new democracies. As I show, while elite divisions can promote democratization, they may also contribute to future instances of democratic breakdown.

In documenting these divisions and their pivotal impact on regime outcomes, my book likewise contributes to an extensive literature on the role of labor-dependent elites in struggles over democracy. While existing studies focus overwhelmingly on elites’ dependence on labor repression, the argument and evidence I present highlight the importance of other forms of labor control. My work demonstrates that co-optive control, while often overlooked in existing scholarship, critically shapes the emergence and stability of new democracies.